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Women in Social and Economic Research 
 
Women in Social and Economic Research (WiSER) is a research program that spans 
two divisions of Curtin University: the Curtin Business School (CBS) and the 
Division of Humanities. WiSER was founded in April 1999 in response to a growing 
void, both within the Australian and international contexts, in the gendered analysis 
of the economic and social policy issues that confront women. As such, WiSER is 
committed to producing high quality quantitative and qualitative research on a broad 
range of issues which women identify as impeding their ability to achieve equity and 
autonomy. The gender perspective generated through the work of WiSER has 
provided a number of key opportunities to inform the policy debates within 
numerous government departments. WiSER seeks to further its commitment to 
providing a meaningful gender analysis of policy through pursuing further research 
opportunities which focus on women’s experiences of social and economic policies 
within the Australian context. The broad objectives of WiSER include: 
 
• To identify the cases and causes of women’s disadvantaged social and 
economic status and to contribute to appropriate policy initiatives to address 
this disadvantage; 
• To demonstrate the way in which social factors, particularly gender, influence 
the construction of economic theory and policy; 
• To extend current theory and research by placing women and their social 
context at the centre of analysis; 
• To contribute an interdisciplinary approach to the understanding of women’s 
position in society. In turn, this should enable the unit to better reflect the 
interrelatedness of the social, economic and political discourses in policy and 
their consequent implications for women;  
• To foster feminist research both nationally and internationally; 
• To expand linkages with industry; 
• To establish and support a thriving Curtin University of Technology post-
graduate research community with a common interest in feminist scholarship. 
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1  Introduction 
On 27 March 2006 new industrial relations legislation, commonly referred to as 
WorkChoices, came into effect in Australia.  The legislation has had a profound effect 
on the way in which wage determination is conducted in Australia. Historically 
centralised wage fixing has characterised the Australian landscape although from the 
mid 1980s this gradually gave way to industry and workplace level enterprise 
bargaining. Legislative provisions for individual (non-union) bargaining have prevailed 
since 1993. Under the Australian Labor Party (ALP) these provisions were not 
actively promoted. While the 1996 industrial reforms of the Howard Coalition 
Government facilitated the making of individual agreements (known as Australian 
Workplace Agreements or AWAs) the take-up of AWAs remained low. Through 
the use of the Corporations Power in the Australian Constitution the Federal 
government has significantly expanded the coverage of the Federal jurisdiction and 
with it access to individual bargaining. Indeed individual bargaining now has priority 
over collective bargaining.  The use of the Corporations Power and expansion of the 
federal jurisdiction has significantly encroached on the coverage previously enjoyed 
by the State jurisdiction. It also circumscribes the ability of individual States to 
influence employment standards.  In this article we review these developments and 
assess the likely effects of the reforms on one particular labour market indicator, the 
gender pay gap.   
 
 
2  A Brief History of Wage Setting in Australia 
 
The Australian system of wage determination is widely regarded as unique. Its 
uniqueness stems, primarily, from the constitutional constraints and the limitations 
placed on the Federal Government to legislate directly on employment matters. 
These provisions are rooted in the tumultuous strikes of the 1890s and their widely 
perceived source in the power imbalance between capital and labour. At the time of 
Federation in 1901 the new constitution thus contained provision for the settlement 
and prevention of industrial disputes, particularly those extending beyond any one 
State. The powers are commonly referred to as the Industrial Powers or the 
Arbitration Powers (Section 51 (xxxv)). The Conciliation and Arbitration Act was 
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drawn-up under these powers and led, in turn, to the establishment of the 
Commonwealth Court of Conciliation and Arbitration which is known today as the 
Australian Industrial Relations Commission (AIRC).  
Over the course of the last century there were numerous High Court challenges as 
to the scope and power of the Act. Over time the Federal jurisdiction became the 
dominant jurisdiction with States (who did have the ability to legislate directly on 
employment matters) agreeing to mirror developments at the Federal level. State 
industrial tribunals soon began the practice of flowing through decisions of the 
Federal industrial tribunal (the AIRC) and in this way brought considerable 
uniformity to the Australian wage structure and community standards enshrined in 
awards. 
 
Other powers in the constitution have also played a role in the regulation of 
industrial relations matters. Section 51(29) (the External Affairs Power) is, for 
example, used to give effect to international conventions such as ILO conventions. 
Under Section 52 the government is able to legislate directly for public service 
employees. Section 51(20) the Corporations Power allows for the making of laws 
with respect to foreign corporations and trading or financial corporations.  It is 
through an extended interpretation of the Corporations Power that the Federal 
government has recently been able to expand the coverage of the Federal 
jurisdiction and widely increase the provision for individual bargaining and the signing 
of formal AWAs (individual, non-union, agreements). 
 
As is implied from the above, the Industrial Powers and the associated industrial 
tribunals have given explicit recognition to trade unions and employer organisations 
in the bargaining process. Individuals were excluded from the system of conciliation 
and arbitration that evolved under the industrial powers. In other words there was 
no provision for the formal recognition of individual or collective non-union 
agreements. In 1993 the ALP creatively used the Corporations Power to allow for 
collective non-union agreements, although the hurdles that parties to such 
agreements faced in the formal ratification of a non-union agreement were a 
significant deterrent to their making. 
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In 1996 the new Liberal-National Coalition (Howard) Government built on the 
Corporations Power to allow for individual bargaining and facilitate making of non-
union collective agreements. The reforms, which came into effect on 27 March 2006, 
go further and indeed prioritise individual bargaining over collective bargaining (a 
reversal of the pre WorkChoices situation).  An individual agreement may now 
override the provisions in a collective agreement. Prior to 2006 this was not 
permitted. 
 
WorkChoices is radically different from past employment regulations. It significantly 
changes the arrangements for wage determination in Australia. As indicated above, 
historically wage setting was the responsibility of the AIRC with decisions flowing 
through to the States via the State tribunals.  In making its determinations the AIRC 
and its state counterparts would typically hear from key parties (eg. governments, 
employer organisations, unions) and on the weight of evidence presented would 
present an arbitrated decision. Over time the AIRC developed a set of ‘wage fixing 
principles’ to guide its determination. The principles were not set in stone but were 
reflective of prevailing community standards and norms. As community standards 
and norms evolved so did the wage fixing principles. By way of example, in the early 
part of the last century the principle of comparative wage justice (CWJ) had 
considerable weight. The commonly held view was that the provision of a ‘fair’ wage 
structure (taken to mean a set of wage relativities known and agreed to by the 
community) would minimise industrial disputation.  As a result of this principle any 
movement in the wages of one group would be flowed through the system. The 
Metalworkers Award soon became an important standard in this regard. The 
industrial power of the metal unions meant it was often the first to call a review of 
award rates. Any decision to vary the conditions, allowances or wages in the metal 
award were, in time, reflected in other awards which benchmarked themselves to 
this key award. 
 
Throughout the 1980s economic principles increasingly dominated the wage fixing 
agenda. CWJ was no longer seen as a basis for fixing wages and national level 
bargaining gradually gave way to industry and workplace level bargaining. That said, 
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social principles such as equity and individual needs did continue to influence the 
decisions of tribunals. 
 
The pre WorkChoices system of industrial relations also afforded an important means 
for raising community standards in areas such as hours, work and family and 
occupational health and safety.  Industrial parties could, at any time, apply for a 
review of conditions of employments in an award. Known as ‘test cases’ this process 
delivered important gains in areas hours of work, parental leave and pay equity.i 
 
Under WorkChoices the wage setting function in the federal jurisdiction no longer 
rests with the AIRC. Responsibility is now vested in a new institution known as the 
Australian Fair Pay Commission (AFPC).  WorkChoices has also effectively stripped 
the award system bare. In 1996 the set of ‘allowable matters’ (i.e. matters that could 
be contained in award) was reduced to 20.ii The 2006 reforms further reduces the 
set of allowable award matters to five minimum conditions:  a minimum hourly rate, 
ten days sick leave, four weeks annual leave (two weeks of which can be ‘cashed 
out’), unpaid parental leave and a maximum number of weekly working hours. The 
changes have also seen the removal of the skill-based career classification (and pay) 
structures from awards. These classifications have been migrated over to a new 
instrument known as the Australian Pay and Classification Scales (APCS).  The AFPC, 
not the AIRC, has responsibility for setting and adjusting rates in the APCS.   
 
As a new institution the AFPC does not, as yet, have a set of wage fixing principles 
to guide it in its determination. The AFPC does, however, have a set of obligations 
that it must follow when setting wages. It must, for example, have regard to: 
 
• The capacity for the unemployed and the low paid to obtain and remain in 
employment 
• Employment and competitiveness across the economy 
• Providing a safety net for the low paid 
• Providing minimum wages for junior employees, employees to whom training 
arrangements apply and employees with disabilities that ensure those 
employees are competitive in the labour market. 
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The development of the APCS and the vesting of responsibility for wage setting in 
the AFPC means that nationally co-ordinated arbitrated bargaining (eg. national wage 
cases) are very much a thing of the past in Australia. The change is expected to see 
greater variation in wages across industries, occupations and states and within 
organisations. In other words, it will lead to widening wage inequality. 
 
Women are likely to be particularly disadvantaged by the move to a more 
decentralised system of wage bargaining.  Australian women have, historically, 
benefited enormously from the centralised system of Australian wage determination.  
By compressing the wage distribution and raising the relative wages of those on the 
bottom, the Australian wage setting system was able to deliver greater levels of 
gender pay equity than those observed in most other Western developed 
economies. WorkChoices will, as noted above deliver greater levels of wage inequality 
and, consequently, greater gender wage gaps as relative pay position of women 
across the pay distribution deteriorates. 
 
Other detrimental effects from WorkChoices with respect to pay equity include: 
• Abolishment of the no-disadvantage test. Under the pre-WorkChoices regime 
individual contracts could only be ratified if it could be shown that the 
conditions of employment were no worse than those provided for under the 
comparator award. This provision has been removed which means individual 
agreements may reduce employment conditions previously provided for in 
the award. 
• Weakening the coverage provided for by the ‘common rule’ provisions. By 
drawing all incorporated companies (small and large) into the federal 
jurisdiction WorkChoices limits the effectiveness of the common rule 
provisions which extended the standards in state awards beyond those who 
were named respondents to the award. 
• Limits on the coverage of state based Equal Remuneration Principles (ERPs). 
ERPs have been used at the state level to prosecute pay equity but with more 
and more employers covered by the federal jurisdiction the effectiveness of 
any state based campaign is effectively reduced. 
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• Limits on the AIRC to make orders for the equal remuneration of work of 
equal value (ERWEV). The ERWEV principle is retained in the Workplace 
Relations Act 1996. However, the transfer of the pay setting function to the 
AFPC will constrain the operation of this principle.iii 
• The removal of the requirement to offer AWAs on the same terms to 
comparable employees.  This opens up potential for greater discrimination 
between workers doing similar work 






3  Pay equity in Western Australia 
 
In this section we profile the current gender wage gap using recent ABS data on 
average wages. The section begins with a brief overview of labour market trends to 
provide a context for discussion of the data. We then examine average wages in the 
full-time labour market before discussing hourly earnings (which include part-time 
employees). 
 
3.1 Western Australian Employment and Participation Rates 
Between 1992 and 2006 total employment in Western Australia increased by 45.2 
per cent, most of it fuelled by strong growth in the part-time sector (underpinned by 
increased demand for labour flexibility amongst employers) (see Figure 1). Nationally 
the corresponding growth rate was 33 per cent. By 2006 there were 1,069,300 
people employed in WA (equal to 10.5 per cent of total employment in Australia). 
Women accounted for 43.9 per cent of all WA employees with the employment of 
women almost equally divided between the full-time and part-time sector. In 2006 52 
per cent of all WA women worked on a full-time basis, i.e. 35 or more hours per 
week. Men employed full-time form the largest single group, equal to 48.5 per cent 
of the workforce, while men employed part-time, 7.7 per cent, form the smallest but 
fastest growing group. By 2006 28.9 per cent of all employees in Western Australia 
were employed on a part-time basis.  













1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
%
Employed - full-time ;
Males ;
Employed - full-time ;
Females ;
Employed - part-time
;  Males ;
Employed - part-time
;  Females ;
Employed - total ; 
Persons ;
WA Employed - full-
time ;  Males ;
WA Employed - part-
time ;  Males ;
WA Employed - full-
time ;  Females ;
WA Employed - part-
time ;  Females ;
 
Western Australia currently boasts the highest growth (population and gross state 
product) and the lowest unemployment rates in the nation. The state also has one of 
the highest participation rates, especially for women. At January 2007 67.4 per cent 
of the potential WA labour force were either in employment or looking for work. 




3.2 AWOTE (Full-time labour market) 
Latest data from the ABS for the full-time labour market shows that the gender pay 
gap in Western Australia is growing. At November 2006 the common ratio of the 
average weekly ordinary time earnings (AWOTE) of non-managerial women and 
men in Western Australia was equal to 74.4 per cent, or a gap of 25.6 per cent.  In 
dollar terms this gap translates to a difference of $317 per week or $16484 per 
annum.iv  National gender wage gap was equal to 16 per cent.  Key determinants of 
the gender pay gap include different bargaining power of different groups, differences 
in industry capacity to pay (eg. mining viz aged care), occupational and industry 
segregation and associated differences in the valuation attached to male and female 
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jobs. Institutional provisions and minimum wage laws also affect the size of the 
gender wage gap.v 
 
At the state level the relative pay position of women in WA has been deteriorating 
since the early 1990s. It reached a low in May 1995 with a gender wage ratio of 76.4 
per cent and slowly recovered to 79.4 per cent by May 2002. Since then the ratio 
has been on the decline again.  
 
The mining boom may account for part of the strong increase in male AWOTE (see 
the WA male/Australian male average shown in figure 2) and thus partly explain the 
recent deterioration in the WA gender pay ratio. However, strong growth in 
earnings of males employed in the mining sector is only part of the story. More 
insight can be derived from a comparison of the WA women/Australian women pay 
ratio. The Australian (and WA) labour markets are characterised by high degrees of 
occupational (and industry) sex segregation. A comparison of WA women with 
women nationally effectively controls for different industry effects on the wages of 
women and men. 
 
Figure 2 shows significant deterioration in the relative pay of WA women relative to 
Australian women in the early 1990s and again from 2002. These changes are not 
driven by developments in the mining industry. Nor are they accounted for by 
changes in the human capital characteristics (eg. education and experience levels) of 
WA women relative to Australian women. These changes would not impact so 
strongly in such a short period of time. 
 
The conclusion drawn is that the observed deterioration in the relative pay of 
women in WA compared to women nationally in wave 1 (commencing 1993) and 
wave 2 (commencing 2002) is that it is institutionally generated.  What might these 
institutional forces be?  Wave 1 coincides with the introduction of individual 
contracts in Western Australia and a strong growth in individual agreements in 
sectors such as health services and retail trade (Crockett and Preston 1998),  Wave 
2 coincides with introduction of new industrial relations in Western Australia 
designed to reduce the attractiveness of individual agreements.  The resultant effect 
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was a growth in the number of Western Australian’s covered by federal AWAs as 
businesses shifted out of the state jurisdiction and into the federal jurisdiction where 
the ratification of an AWA was much easier. 
 
It is further hypothesised here that the recent improvement in the relative pay 
position of women in Western Australia relative to women nationally has more to 
do with the deterioration in the pay position of women nationally. As more and 
more women nationally are covered by AWAs in the federal jurisdiction where it is 
more difficult to preserve pay and conditions it is likely that this will impact on their 
actual pay and thus their relative pay compared to West Australians. The following 
analysis of hourly pay data sheds more light on this hypothesis. 
 
 




Wage Relativities in WA: 























































































































3.3 Hourly Rates  
As an indicator of wage movements, trends in the full-time labour market provide 
only a part-picture. As noted above, employment growth in recent years has been 
particularly strong in the part-time sector where arrangements for wage 
determination are quite different.  Recent data from the ABS Employee Earnings and 
Hours Survey shows that nationally 12.5 per cent of persons employed full-time were 
award dependent workers at the time of the last survey (May 2006). In the part-time 
sector the corresponding share was 33.8 per cent.  Part-time employees (which 
includes casual workers) are thus much less likely to be covered by formal 
agreements (eg. collective agreements) and much more likely to be dependent on 
decisions of the AIRC (and now the AFPC) for wage increases. 
 
By focussing on hourly earnings we capture averages of employees in the full-time 
and part-time sectors.  Table 1 sets out the average hourly cash earnings (adjusted 
for salary sacrificing) of men and women in Australia and WA.   When the analysis is 
restricted to non-managerial employees and based on hourly cash earnings rather 
than AWOTE a different picture to that painted above emerges.  The first, and 
perhaps most obvious, is that the gap in the earnings of Western Australian women 
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relative to the national average has gone.  That said, at a more disaggregated level, 
differences exist.  
 
WA women on awards and unregistered individual agreements earn between four 
and five per cent less than their counterparts nationally.  There is also a favourable 
(almost non-existent) gender wage gap in this sector. The story is less positive for 
workers covered by other agreement forms. AWAs have the worst outcomes. 
Nationally the AWA gender pay gap is around 20 per cent, in Western Australia the 
AWA gender pay gap is closer to 37 per cent.  
 
 
Table 1: Average Hourly Cash Earnings (A$), Non-managerial adult 






 Ratio (%) 
  Males Females Males Females Males Females 
Award only $18.0 $18.6 $16.60 $17.80 0.92 0.96 
Registered collective 
agreements $28.7 $25.7 $29.10 $25.60 1.01 1.00 
Unregistered collective 
agreements $23.6 $20.7 $28.00 $20.20 1.19 0.98 
Registered individual 
agreements $28.1 $22.8 $36.70 $23.20 1.31 1.02 
Unregistered individual 
arrangements $27.2 $23.1 $28.90 $21.90 1.06 0.95 
All methods of setting 
pay $26.3 $23.2 $28.80 $23.10 1.10 1.00 
Source: ABS 6306.0 
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Figure 3 
Comparisons of Gender Wage Ratio Australia & WA, by Form of Agreement, May 2006
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4  Discussion 
 
Amongst all states and territories in Australia Western Australia’s record with 
respect to gender equality (as measured by the gender pay gap) is the most 
disappointing.  At November 2006 the gender wage ratio was equal to 74.4 per cent 
in the full-time non-managerial labour market. Nationally the corresponding ratio 
was 84 per cent. 
 
Institutional arrangements affecting wage determination at both the state and federal 
levels have impacted on the relative pay position of women within the state. The 
introduction of individual bargaining in Western Australia in 1993 (wave 1) 
contributed to the first observed significant deterioration in their pay position. The 
second slide (wave 2) followed the introduction of legislative changes which made 
individual bargaining in Western Australia difficult and encouraged flight to the 
federal jurisdiction. The more recent improvement in the pay position of women in 
WA relative to women nationally may relate to recent legislative changes in the 
federal jurisdiction, the removal of award protection (eg. the removal of the no-
disadvantage test) and possible deterioration in Australian women’s wages as a result 
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(in May 2006 the WA women/Australian women AWA wage ratio was equal to 102 
per cent; in other words, WA women on AWAs earned 2 per cent more than their 
counterparts nationally). 
 
The interesting policy question to arise from all this is how best to address the large 
and significant wage gap. In the past the West Australian Industrial Relations 
Commission (WAIRC) could have reviewed all state award rates and ordered 
necessary adjustments (eg. for work value).  The WAIRC, of course, can still 
undertake such a review but the coverage of the state award system has been 
significantly reduced following forced entry of incorporated businesses (large and 
small) into the federal jurisdiction. 
 
The WA government retains power to set and adjust the state minimum wage 
covered by the Minimum Conditions of Employment Act 1993 (WA) however the 
coverage and impact of this act is again curtailed by the shift of so many incorporated 
businesses to the federal jurisdiction. 
  
In a recent report by Joan Eveline and Trish Todd (2004) to the WA Parliament on 
strategies to combat gender wage inequities in Western Australia the authors 
recommend a suite of regulatory and voluntary strategies.vi. The voluntary strategies 
which are being vigorously pursued through the recently established Pay Equity Unit 
within the Department of Consumer and Employment Protection (DOCEP) include: 
gender audits; public sector best practice, education and training (including educating 
on pay equity) and equal employment opportunity.vii  The regulatory 
recommendations from Eveline and Todd (eg. requirement that registration only be 
given where parties have demonstrated that an agreement has addressed gender 
equity considerations) are equally creative and laudable, but their likely impact, if 
implemented, significantly reduced. 
 
In summary WorkChoices has significantly curtailed the ability of State governments to 
affect large, significant and quick changes to the gender pay gap.  Changes through 
the voluntary strategies will have a positive, but much slower, effect. WorkChoices has 
similarly curtailed the ability of the States to advance important labour standards. 
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Historically it has been through the State systems that many important changes (eg. 
parental leave) have been initiated and won.  
 
5  Conclusion 
WorkChoices marks a radical departure from the past and signals a new era for wage 
fixing in Australia. Whereas the pre-WorkChoices era was characterised by highly 
centralised, co-ordinated wage negotiations the post-WorkChoice era is the complete 
opposite. Individual bargaining takes precedent over collective bargaining and co-
ordinated bargaining (eg. pattern bargaining) is expressly prohibited.  Using the 
Corporations Power of the Australian Constitution the Federal Howard 
Government has been able to significantly enlarge the coverage of the Federal 
jurisdiction. Whereas in the past employers (and unions) could pick and choose 
between jurisdictions, now all constitutional corporations (incorporated companies) 
are drawn into the Federal jurisdiction even if they express a preference to remain in 
the State system. From a public policy perspective this development restricts the 
capacity for State governments and tribunals to respond to labour market 
developments, such as the large and growing gender wage gap in WA. It also 
restricts the capacity for the States to advance labour standards through avenues 
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i  Recent test case decisions include 1969/72 Equal Pay decision: 1979 Maternity Leave; 1985 
Adoption Leave; 1990 Parental Leave; 1994 Family Leave; 1995 Personal/Carer’s Leave; 2001 
Parental Leave for Casual Employees; 2002 Reasonable Hours/Working Hours; and 2005 Family 
Provisions.    
ii  1. Classification of employees and skill based career paths; 2. Ordinary time hours of work 
and the times in which they are performed, rest breaks, notice periods and variations to working hours ; 
3. Rates of pay generally (including hourly rates and annual salaries), rates of pay for juniors, trainees 
and apprentices, and rates of pay for employees under the supported wage system; 4. Incentive-based 
payments (other than tallies in the meat industry), piece rates and bonuses. 5. Annual leave and leave 
loadings; 6. Long service leave; 7. Personal/carer's leave, including carer's leave, sick leave, family 
leave, bereavement leave, compassionate leave, cultural leave and other like forms of leave; 8. Parental 
leave, including maternity leave, paternity leave and adoption leave; 9. Public holidays; 10. 
Allowances; 11. Loadings for working overtime or for casual work or shift work;  12. Penalty rates; 13. 
Redundancy pay; 14. Notice of termination; 15. Stand-down provisions; 16. Dispute settling procedure; 
17. Jury service; 18. Type of employment, such as full-time employment, casual employment, regular 
part-time employment and shift work; 19. Superannuation; and 20. Pay and conditions for outworkers. 
iii  As Alan Grinsell-Jones from Deacons Lawyers notes “… the AIRC’s power to make any 
order adjusting those rate son the basis of the equal pay for work of equal value principle is effectively 
extinguished”. (Alan Grinsell Jones (2006), notes from an ACT pay equity roundtable). 
iv  The AWOTE for non-managerial men employed full-time in WA in November 2006 was 
equal to $64,027.6 per week annum (or $1124.90 per week).  
v  Other contributory factors include working arrangements (eg. full-time and part-time jobs), 
access to education and training, access to promotion, family responsibilities, discrimination, glass 
ceiling etc.  
vi  The full report along with an Executive Summary may be found at 
http://www.docep.wa.gov.au/lr/WorkLife/Pay%20Equity/Pages/Review_of_the_Gender.html 
vii    For further information on the work of the WA Pay Equity Unit see 
http://www.docep.wa.gov.au/lr/WorkLife/Pay%20Equity/Pages/The_Pay_Equity_Unit_.html 
 
 
 
 
